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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

In Statewide, the second department construed the statute strictly
in holding that the application for a stay of arbitration must be commenced by a special proceeding requiring service of notice of the
application for a stay upon the party and not his attorney since CPLR
7503(c) states that the notice "shall be served in the same manner
as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested." The court required service on the party, even if made by
mail, since the manner was to be that of service of a summons.
However, in Bauer, the attorney for the claimants sent a demand
to arbitrate to MVAIC which, in turn, sent a notice of a stay of arbitration in the prescribed manner to the claimants' attorney within the ten
day period of limitation. In reversing the lower court, the fourth department based its decision upon practicality. The court, while admitting that a stay of arbitration calls for a special proceeding, determined that by making the demand for arbitration by means of an
attorney, the claimants authorized and in fact designated their attorney
to receive process. The court found additional support for its view in
CPLR 7506(d) which provides in part that "[filf a party is represented
by an attorney, papers to be served on the party shall be served upon his
attorney." Therefore, once a party demands arbitration through an
attorney, the attorney becomes the agent to receive process to confer
jurisdiction upon the court in a special proceeding.
The court also commented upon the fairness and practicality of
this interpretation. The attorney must be notified by the party served
with notice anyway, so as to enable him to act quickly and expeditiously, and such prompt action would be further assured by this ruling.
Until the Court of Appeals has resolved the conflict between departments, the cautious practitioner should serve both the party and
his attorney or, at least, the adverse party.
Aimrici

78-PROCEEDING AGAiNST BODY OR OppiCER

CPLR 7804(g): First department affirms findings in an Article 78 proceeding but substitutes a "more appropriate"penalty.
Ancis v. Lomenzo 12 was an Article 78 proceeding under CPLR
7804(g), which permits appeals from administrative determinations to
the appellate division where the appellant raises a question under
CPLR 7803.113
112 31 App. Div. 2d 615, 295 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1st Dep't 1969).

113 The questions which may be raised in an Article 78 proceeding under CPLR
7803 are:
1. whether the body...

failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law; or

2. whether the body

proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or

...
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In Ancis, the petitioner's real estate broker's license was revoked
because of a finding of untrustworthiness, and he sought review on the
grounds that the finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. The
court held that the finding was supported by substantial evidence of
untrustworthiness, but that the penalty suffered was too severe. Accordingly, the court reduced the penalty of revocation of petitioner's
license to suspension for three months, deeming the reduced penalty
to be "more appropriate."
The Ancis decision clearly illustrates the appellate division's authority under CPLR 7804(g) to dispose of all issues in the proceeding
before it on appeal or transfer. This procedure allows the petitioner
to obtain a review of all issues even though the application to the
court is based solely upon the grounds set forth in CPLR 7803.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL § 250: Presumption of domicile held not applicable to bilateral
Mexican divorce.
Section 250 of the DRL creates the presumption that a person who
resides within New York for prescribed periods before and after a
divorce action is commenced in a foreign jurisdiction, or who at all
times maintains a residence within the state, is a domiciliary of New
York when the action is commenced. The legislative intent of this
enactment is unknown," 4 but presumably its aim is to aid in the dissolution of foreign divorces on the theory that one domiciled in New
York can not be domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction. However, in
direct opposition to this presumption is the long established precedent
that a divorce decree of a sister-state may only be challenged on jurisdictional grounds when one party had insufficient opportunity to contest
the action." 5 This would therefore preclude section 250 from operating
on bilateral sister-state divorces. Such decrees must be given full faith
and credit by the state of marital domicile and can not be relitigated
in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected
by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion as to
the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed; or
4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held ... is, on the entire
record, supported by substantial evidence.
"14DRL section 250 was not included in the draft bill submitted by the Joint
Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Laws, hence there is no committee
report indicating the legislative intent. Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 18 SYRiCUsE L. REv. 157,
177 n.133 (1966).
115Paulsen, Divorce Jurisdiction By Consent of the Parties-Develapments Since
"Sherrer v. Sherrer", 26 IND. L.J. 380, 386 (1950-51). See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S.
581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226

(1945).

